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Teig: Natural Resources - Property Clause - Local Land Use Regulation P
NATURAL RESOURCES - PROPERTY CLAUSE - Local Land Use Regulation
Preempted. Brubaker v. Board of County Commissioners, El Paso County,
652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982).
In 1966, twenty-five mining claims were located within the boundaries
of Pike National Forest west of Colorado Springs.' The locators began
preliminary exploration on the claims, but these activities were halted by
the United States Forest Service in 1967.2 Shortly thereafter, the United
States brought an action before the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA)
contesting the validity of the claims. 8 In 1971, with resolution of the claim
dispute still pending, the Forest Service obtained an injunction against any
further exploration on the claims.4 The IBLA ruling, handed down in 1975,6
declared eighteen of the twenty-five disputed claims void for failure to
discover valuable mineral deposits. 6 With respect to the remaining seven
claims, the IBLA concluded that if certain limestone outcroppings
discovered prior to withdrawal could be verified as valuable, the claims
might be valid.' The ruling also authorized test drilling in order that the
claim dispute could finally be resolved."
Claimants than brought an action in federal district court to force implementation of the IBLA ruling. 9 The court entered an order allowing the
test drilling to proceed, but also required the claimants to submit an
operating plan for approval by the United States Forest Service. 10 Prior to
approval, the plan was modified to include a provision directing the
claimants to comply with all applicable state, county, and municipal laws.11
In response to this directive, the claimants applied to the El Paso County
Board for a special use permit.' 2 Following exhaustive hearings on the application the permit was denied. The Board reasoned that the proposed
drilling was inconsistent with long range county land use planning and also
incompatible with existing permitted uses in the area.' s
After this denial, the claimants filed an action in El Paso County
District Court, asserting that the action of the Board impermissibly con1. Brubaker v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, El Paso County, 6523 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Colo. 1982).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Foresyth, 321 F. Supp. 761 (D. Colo. 1971). It was the position of the
government that the locators would not be entitled to perform any further exploration
after the date on which the Forest Service request to withdraw the area from mineral
entry was filed in the public record. Id. at 764.
5. United States v. Foresyth, IBLA 73-166 (Oct. 30, 1975).
6. 652 P.2d at 1052.
7. Id. at 1052-53. In order to establish the validity of a miningclaim, it must be proven that a
valuable mineral deposit exists. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). In a dispute between the United
States and a claimant, a mineral deposit is valuable only if it may be removed and
marketed at a profit. This determination must normally be made prior to withdrawal
from mineral entry. United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
8. 652 P.2d at 1053.
9. Id.
10. Id. Federal regulations outline the rules and procedures required to ensure that adverse
environmental impact to national forest lands as a result of mining activity are minimized. 36 C.F.R. § 228.5 (1981).
11. 652 P.2d at 1053.
12. Id. The El Paso County Board considered the permit necessary as the area to be affected
was zoned for agriculture.
13. Id.
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flicted with the operation of federal law 14 and therefore was preempted.'5
The court found that the traditional tests for establishing federal preemption were not met and upheld the Board's action. On appeal, the decision
was reversed. In a majority opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
the Board had applied its zoning laws so as to prohibit a use of federal land
which was authorized by federal statute, and that
such action was void by
16
virtue of applied preemption doctrine principles.
BACKGROUND

The preemption doctrine is fundamentally rooted in the supremacy
clause17 which provides the constitutional framework for federal preemptive power over contrary state legislation. 18 It is important to note,
however, that while every congressional exercise of an enumerated power
has potential preemptive capabilities, 1 9 the potential may be limited by the
tenth amendment police power reservation. 20 This is particularly relevant
where, as in Brubaker, the power of Congress to enact legislation comes
from the property clause.2 1 Prior to 1976, this power was treated as proprietary rather than legislative, and it was only after the United States
Supreme Court decision in Keppe v. New Mexico 22 that the federal government could assert full preemptive power on public land issues. However,
despite the impact the Keppe decision has had on state and federal relationships, it is clear that, with respect to federally owned lands, the federal
government continues to share its jurisdiction with the appropriate state or
local entity. 8 More specifically, and in the context of the Brubakerdispute,
the power of local governments to regulate2 4 land use in the national forest
has been recognized in the federal courts.
There are two situations where federal preemption of state law is likely
to occur. First, if Congress has supplied a clear expression of its intent to
14. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§
22-54 (1976)).
15. 652 P.2d at 1054.
16. Id. at 1060.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The supremacy clause provides that, "[tihis constitution, and the
laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law
of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
18. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
19. Engdahl, Preemptive Capabilityof FederalPower,45 U. COLO. L. REv. 51,55-56 (1973).
20. U.S. CONS'r. amend. X. The tenth amendment provides that "[tlhe powers not delegated
to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people." See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usury,
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
21. U.S. CONS'r. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The property clause provides, in part, that "congress shall
have the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the
territory or other property belonging to the United States...
22. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). Prior to the Kleppe decision, it was argued and supported by case
law that under the property clause, Congress acted as a proprietor, subject to state law.
See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe,
114 U.S. 525 (1885). That view, however, was replaced with a general proposition that
congressional power with respect to the property clause is legislative as well as proprietary, with full preemptive capabilities. 426 U.S. at 540.
23. Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
24. City and County of Denver v. Bergland, 517 F. Supp. 155, 168 (D.Colo. 1981).
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supercede all state regulation in a particular field, no state laws which embrace that field will be enforceable. 5 Second, in the absence of any clear expression or other such manifestation, a court may imply preemptive
intent. 26 The factors which a court may take into consideration in this context include: inferences revealed by statutory language and respective
legislative history;27 the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme;28
the nature of the subject matter vis-a-vis the demand for uniformity of
regulation; 29 and finally whether the state law conflicts with federal law so
as to present an obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress. °
The applicable federal law in Brubaker is the Mining Law of 187231
which provides no clear expression of an intent to preempt the entire field
of mining and in fact makes clear reference to existing and applicable state
and local regulation of mining activities.12 As a result, preemption doctrine
analysis in the context of mining activities on federal land necessarily involves a search for implied preemptive intent.8 3
THE DECISION
The Colorado Supreme Court, in striking down the Board's action,
recognized the power of Congress to enact and enforce laws governing the
use of federal lands 84 and specifically concluded that the underlying objective of the Mining Law of 1872 was to encourage exploration and development of mineral resources on public lands.38 The court, relying heavily on
36
the similar case of Ventura County v. GulfOil Corporation,
went on to
hold that the Board's denial of the special use permit "reflect[ed] an attempt by the county to substitute its judgment for that of Congress concerning the appropriate use of these lands [and that] such a veto power...
strikes at the central purpose and objectives of the applicable federal
law."8' 7 In response to the Board's argument that the operating plan approved by the Forest Service provided an explicit basis for local jurisdiction, the court held that since the provision related to applicable state and
local regulation, and that a preemption finding would render all non-federal
regulations inapplicable, the provision was in no way determinative in their
analysis.38 Furthermore, the Board's assertion that its action was supported by the savings provisions of sections 2239 and 2640 of the Mining
25. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952).
26. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
27. Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
28. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
29. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmnon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
30. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
31. 30 U.S.C. §§ 24-54 (1976).
32. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 26, 28 (1976).
33. Engdahl, supra note 19, at 52.
34. 652 P.2d at 1055-56.
35. Id. at 1056.
36. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd withoW opinion, 445 U.S. 947 (1980). In Ventura,
county zoning laws were held preempted by the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920. 30
U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976).
37. 652 P.2d at 1056.
38. I& at 1057.
39. Section 22 provides, in part, that "lands belonging to the United States ... shall be free
and open to exploration and purchase ... under regulations prescribed by law, and
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Law met with similar disfavor. 4 1 Interpreting the direct conflict language
of these provisions, the court reasoned that local regulations which prohibit
mining activities could not stand the test of preemption; indicating,
that non-prohibitive local regulation would be treated
however, 42
differently.
The court in Brubaker thus concluded that the denial of a special use
permit functioned as a prohibition to a use of federal land authorized by
Congress. As such, the denial represented a direct conflict "with the objecreflected in the federal mining laws," 43 and
tives and purposes of Congress
44
was therefore preempted.
PROHIBITION v. REGULATION:
THE LIMITs OF AUTHORITY

In Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corporation,46 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals was confronted with application of the preemption doctrine in the
context of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.46 The government's
lessee in Ventura was requested by the county to apply for a zoning permit
prior to drilling operations. Gulf Oil refused to make the application and the
county 4filed for injunctive relief. 47 Relying hevily on Kleprpe v. New
Mexico, 8 the court reasoned that because the county had sought to prohibit
Gulf from any further activity, the conflict between federal and state law
was direct. 49 In striking down the county zoning law, the court held that, as
a prohibition to an authorized use of federal land, the local regulation
0
represented an impermissible obstacle to the objectives of Congress.
Although the Ventura court made no reference to the 1976 decision in
State Ex Rel. Andrus v. Click,"' the issues presented there were essentially
the same. The Idaho Supreme Court, faced with a potential conflict between state regulations and the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 52 held that
state regulation of federally authorized mining activities was consistent
with congressional intent, but only to the extent that the state law did not
operate as a prohibition of such activities.5 " This conclusion was based on a
according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining districts, so far as
the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States." 30

U.S.C. § 22 (1976).

40. Section 26 provides, inpart, that "locators of all mining locations... so long as they comply with the laws of the United States, and with state, territorial, and local regulations
not in conflict with the laws of the United States governing their possesory title, shall
have the exclusive right of possession and enjoyment of all the surface included within the
lines of their locations, and of all veins, lodes, and ledges throughout their entire
depth...." 30 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
41. Brubaker v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050, 1058 (1982).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1060.

44. Id.
45. 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979).

46. See supranote 36.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

601 F.2d at 1082.
426 U.S. 529 (1976). See supra note 22.
601 F.2d at 1084.
Id. at 1086.
97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969 (1976).
Id. at 974.

53. Id.
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1905 United States Supreme Court decision which upheld a Montana location requirement. In Butte City Water Co. v. Baker,54 the Supreme Court
held that state location requirements did not establish a sufficient conflict
so as to render them void, indicating, however, that state laws which would
prohibit federally authorized mining activities would not be permissible
under established preemption doctrine principles. 55
The preemption doctrine as appliced in this line of cases involved the interpretation of congressional intent with respect to federal mining law,
particularly the Mineral Land Leasing Act of 1920. While Brubaker involved the Mining Law of 1872, it seems apparent from the language of these
acts that Congress intended to allow states to regulate mining activities, at
least to the extent that such regulation presented no conflict with the
federal regulatory scheme.5" Further, the Ventura decision made it clear
that a state effort to prohibit federally authorized mining activities is a
direct conflict with congressional objectives. 57
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The underlying purpose of the Mining Law of 1872, as recognized by
the court in Brubaker, is to encourage exploration and development of
mineral resources on public lands.58 It is clear, however, that there was no
manifestation of congressional intent to preempt the entire field of mining,
either explicitly or impliedly.59 Considering the remaining factors which
might compel a preemption finding, 60 application of the doctrine to a situation like that presented in Brubakernecessarily concerns the direct conflict
standard. 61 In Brubaker,the Colorado Supreme Court found support for its
holding in the Ventura decision,"62 but also recognized compelling logic independent of Ventura." The court, as noted earlier, relied on the direct
conflict rationale to support its decision.6 4 The strength of the Ventura
decision as compelling precedent, as well as the strength of the court's rationale with respect to the direct conflict issue, will be the subject of the
following analysis.
The difficulties in drawing analogies between Ventura and Brubaker
are substantial. To begin, the Ventura court was confronted with an entirely different federal scheme. 65 While the Mineral Lands Leasing Act is
54. 196 U.S. 119 (1905).
55. Id. at 125.
56. See supra notes 39-40.
57. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 1979).
58. 652 P.2d at 1056.
59. Hubbard, Dredge Mining and Wild Burros-A Tale of Two Cases and the Issue of State
Versus FederalRegulation of MineralDevelopment on PublicDomain Lands, 23 RocKY
MTN. MiN. L. INsT. 71, 80-81 (1977).
60. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
61. With respect to mining activities on federal land, the demand for uniformity is weak.
Also, federal mining legislation is not so persuasive that it could be inferred that congress
has left no room for state regulation. As a result, the application of the preemption doctrine in this area is a function of the direct conflict issue. See Hubbard, supra note 59, at
83-84.
62. 652 P.2d at 1056.
63. Id. at 1059.
64. Id.
65. 601 F.2d at 1082.
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exhaustive in its consideration of regulated land use and environmental
concern, 66 the Mining Law of 1872 has been noted for its lack of bona fide
regulation of mineral exploration activities.67 In addition, the Forest Service permit to drill for oil in Ventura made no reference to local
regulation.6 8 The situation presented in Brubaker, on the other hand, involved a United States Forest Service operating plan which made it clear
69
that there must first be compliance with state and local laws. Finally, it
scheme so
the
federal
considered
court
may be inferred that the Ventura
pervasive that it necessitated an implied preemption holding. 70 Because the
claims made in Brubaker were under the authority of an entirely different
set of federal statutes,71 it was inappropriate for the Colorado Supreme
Court to rely so heavily on the Ventura decision.
Irrespective of the precedential bearing the Ventura decision has on
decision
the result in Brubaker, Justice Lohr's opinion indicates that the
2
could have been supported by the direct conflict standard alone.1 This position is arguably weakened by two important considerations. First, the
court ignored the fact that the primary movers in the effort to prevent exploratory drilling on the lands in question were the Forest Service and the
Bureau of Land Management, 7 3 each an agency of the federal government
and acting under the authority of federal law.7 4 At a very minimum, these
actions signify a willingness on behalf of the federal government to waive
consideration of the direct conflict issue.
Second, when the test for preemption is narrowed to the direct conflict
issue, the purposes and objectives of congressional action should have been
argued and considered in the context of all relevant public land use legislation. When Congress enacted the Mining Law of 1872, the concern was
with economic development of the nation's natural resources. Notwithstanding this fact, the policy concerns of 1872 have been overlayed with subsequent legislation which reflect new and different congressional objectives.
In Brubaker, the court failed to consider subsequent acts of Congress which
would support the action of the El Paso County Board. The most relevant
in this context are the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA),76 the Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970,76 and the
Act of 1976
Federal Land Policy and Management
66. Id. at 1083-84.
67. State ex rel. Andrus v. Click, 97 Idaho 791, 554 P.2d 969, 976 (1976).
68. 601 F.2d at 1083-84.
69. 652 P.2d at 1053.
70. 601 F.2d at 1084-85. The Ventura court held that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act
preempted local zoning laws regardless of whether the permit would have been granted
or denied. Since the actual conflict issue had not yet ripened, the decision may be read as
holding that Congress intended to occupy the entire field to the exclusion of the states by
virtue of the complexity and pervasiveness of the enacted regulatory scheme.
71. 652 P.2d at 1054.
72. Id. at 1059-60.
73. Id. at 1052-53.
74. The Organic Administration Act authorizes the Secretay of Agriculture to make rules
and regulations for the protection of the national forests. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1982). The
operating plan approved in Brubaker is required by pursuant federal regulations. 36
C.F.R. § 228.5 (1981). The Bureau of Land Management has authority to lease mineral
deposits underlying national forest lands. 43 C.F.R. § 3400.2, 3400.3-3 (1981).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
76. 42 U.S.C. §§ 43714374 (1976).
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(FLPMA).77 This legislation was intended to temper the pro-development
objectives of 1872 by providing federal agencies with the policy guidelines
and implementation plans necessary to ensure that environmental concerns are given proper consideration.
NEPA and the Environmental Quality Improvement Act
In 1872, the concern for economic development of our nation's natural
resources was paramount. Public land use legislation enacted during that
period reflects this pro-development stance. Such concerns, however, as
objectives of Congress, were drastically tempered by the passage of NEPA
and subsequent environmental legislation. NEPA proclaimed a national
policy for the enhancement of environmental quality, recognizing "the profound influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial expansion, [and] resource exploitation .... ,"8 The act also expressed a federal mandate to improve and coordinate federal planning, programs, and resources in such a way that a balance could be achieved between population and resource use. 9
The Environmental Quality Improvement Act was passed shortly after
NEPA and evidences NEPA policy by enacting statutes which relate to
prevention, abatement, and control of environmental pollution, particularly with respect to water and land resources.8 0 The legislation also
recognizes that implementation of these policies is not only a responsibility
of the federal government, but of state and local governments as well. 8'
Rejecting any real implications which this legislation might have on its
analysis,8 ' the court in Brubaker relied on the 1973 decision in United
States v. SCRAP83 in which the United States Supreme Court held that
8 s4
"NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute.
This decision, however, does not fully resolve the issues relating to conflicts
with other federal legislation. In Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic
Rivers Association,8 the Supreme Court reiterated its position that NEPA
overlays the mandates of federal agencies, indicating, however, that when
a conflict of a clear and fundamental nature exists, it is the original and
primary mandate which must take precedence.8 6 This holding was refined
87
There the
by the Fifth Circuit in LouisianaPower and Light Co. v. FPC.
court held that "the proper test is whether compliance with the dictates
of NEPA would give rise to a violation [of other] statutory
responsibilities .... ,,88
It is apparent from this line of cases that NEPA does in fact overlay the
entire spectrum of federal land use legislation. When conflicts arise it is up
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 4371(b) (2) (1976).
Id.
652 P.2d at 1059.
412 U.S. 669 (1973).
Id. at 694.
426 U.S. 776 (1976).
Id. at 779.
557 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 1126.
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to the courts to determine the extent of the conflict and then rule accordingly. In Brubaker,the El Paso County Board denied the special use permit
on essentially environmental grounds.8 9 None of the authorities discussed
above, however, would seem to imply that NEPA must be ignored in determining whether a state action conflicts with congressional purposes and objectives. On the contrary, it would be more appropriate to argue that
NEPA must be considered as long as no federal statutory conflict is determined to exist. Given this proposition, it could be argued that the Board's
action in Brubaker furthered the environmental concerns of NEPA, and
that recognition of this fact would be entirely consistent with congressional
intent. Such an approach would merely reflect the proper concerns and
perspectives in the public land use context of 1980.
The FederalLand Policy and Management Act
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) 90
represents a consolidation of hundreds of public land statutes and the first
comprehensive document to spell out the powers and duties of the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM). 91 In FLPMA, Congress expressed a desire
that mineral development efforts not interfere with nonfederal environmental control efforts.92 The Act also requires the Secretary of the Interior to provide for meaningful involvement of state and local officials in
BLM planning. 98 Even if the planning requirements of FLPMA do not
directly apply to the proposed mineral drilling in Brubaker, the Act suggests increasing congressional deference to state and local regulation of
mineral development.9 4 In addition, while it is not yet clear how FLPMA
may change the direction of state and federal relationships in this area,9 6
the Act as it is written is fully capable of providing courts with congressional purposes and objectives. The Colorado Supreme Court needlessly
confined its analysis to the narrow objectives of the Mining Law of 1872,
and, in doing so, undermined the legitimate concerns of the El Paso County
Board. Constituent demands for adequate protection from inconsistent and
damaging land uses were reflected in the Board's denial of the special land
use permit. To the extent that these demands were consistent with the
philosophy of recent federal legislation, a direct conflict with congressional
purposes and objectives becomes more difficult to perceive.
89. The Board found specifically that the proposed special use was incompatible with existing
permitted uses and that it would result in undue congestion. At hearings before the
Board, public objections to the proposal focused on the noise, congestion, and general incompatability with residential land uses in the area. Brief for Appellee at 11-13, Brubaker
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, El Paso County, 652 P.2d 1050 (1982).
90. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976).
91. Hubbard, supra note 59, at 89.
92. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (c) (8) (1976). The act declares that "in the development and revision of
land use plans, the Secretary [of the Interior] shall .. . provide for compliance with applicable pollution control laws, including State and Federal air, water, noise or other
pollution standards or implementation plans ... ." (Emphasis added).
93. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (c) (9) (1976).
94. Note, State and Local Control of Mineral Development on FederalLands, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 373, 379.(1980).
95. The Department of the Interior has estimated that it may take until 1989 before the
FLPMA planning process is complete. 44 Fed. Reg. 42,590 (1979).
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CONCLUSION

The property clause grants Congress wide ranging powers with respect
to mineral development on public lands. State and local governments,
however, have historically enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction over these lands.
When federal and state laws conflict, as they often do, preemption doctrines may provide a remedy. The result, however, is rarely favorable to
state or local interests.
In its analysis of preemptive intent, the Brubaker court correctly
recognized the purposes and objectives of the Mining Law of 1872, and concluded that because the Board's action prohibited rather than regulated
federally authorized mining activities the action was impermissible. In this
respect, the court's decision is consistent with previous case law which has
struck down state regulations that attempted to prohibit federally authorized mining activities.
The court's analysis, however, is weakened by its failure to incorporate
and define congressional objectives in a broad, rather than narrow,
perspective. By limiting the analysis to the Mining Law of 1872, the court
effectively ignored recent federal legislation which indicates congressional
deference to state environmental concerns. El Paso County would not have
been involved in this dispute but for the zealousness of the Forest Service
and its attempt to prevent drilling activities on the lands in question. The
action of the Board was based on the environmental concerns of their constituents, and was entirely consistent with the position of the federal
government. In this context, the doctrine of preemption by direct conflict
should not have been applied without consideration of all relevant land use
legislation. Given such a broad perspective on the purposes and objectives
of Congress, the court should have upheld the lower court's disposition of
the matter.
JOE TEIG
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